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a b s t r a c t
This article provides an historical analysis of arguments for and against using forests for fuel since the
1970s energy crises, and explores the relationship between public narratives and the implementation
of renewable energy technologies. I argue that different ideas about the use of forest resources created
narrative conﬂict between stakeholder groups, and this conﬂict inﬂuenced the development of biomass
energy systems by limiting private investment and shaping public policy. Promoters and opponents of
forest fuels both worked to achieve political goals as well as economic and environmental ones, and
debates about biomass energy reﬂected these different views. Although this paper focuses on public
perceptions about wood energy in the US, biomass advocacy in the US was inﬂuenced by efforts in other
countries, particularly by innovation in Sweden and Finland. By providing an historical investigation
of the cultural barriers to developing decentralized renewable energy systems in the US, and explaining
how this experience compared with biomass development in other countries, this research demonstrates
how conﬂicting narratives have shaped energy and environmental policy since the 1970s. This historical
perspective contains valuable lessons about how different social groups’ values and beliefs have affected
– and continue to affect – decisions about new energy technologies.
© 2016 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

1. Introduction
The chainsaw may seem like an unlikely tool for sustainable
energy production, but since the energy crises in the 1970s, renewable energy advocates in industrial countries have worked to
rekindle interest in the use of forests for fuel. Yet like with other
decentralized sources of energy, the embers of support for biomass
development have been slow to ignite. Instead, the topic has
sparked conﬂict and debate about appropriate energy sources and
the size and scope of renewable energy technologies. On a deeper
level, like energy transitions in other times and places, debates
about biomass development have often involved clashes between
fundamentally different visions of the future. These conﬂicting
visions were expressed through narratives that also suggested different relationships with existing power structures and scales of
governance. Arguments for or against the development of biomass
were often tied to political questions about the decentralization and
centralization of power. These arguments were inﬂuenced by different cultural norms and attitudes towards resource extraction. An
examination of the narratives employed by biomass advocates and
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critics since the 1970s reveals how conﬂicting perceptions about
land management and political control have shaped, and in some
ways, have failed to shape, energy decisions and policy.
Biomass energy is a large category that includes all energy produced from plant material. Liquid biofuels like ethanol or methanol
can be produced from corn or perennial grasses like switchgrass.
Plant-based feedstocks can also be burned to produce electrical
power. This paper focuses on energy derived from wood and used
primarily for heat and/or electricity, including domestic woodstoves, wood boilers, combined heat and power facilities, and
large industrial-scale power plants. Aside from domestic ﬁrewood,
most wood used in these applications has come as a byproduct
of other forest products, and in some cases as municipal solid
waste. Although in the 1970s and ‘80s, the US government pursued
research on the economic potential of methanol, a liquid transportation fuel that can be derived from wood, this paper does not
focus on debates about liquid biofuels. In addition to the unique
technological factors involved in the production and distribution of
liquid biofuels, methanol and ethanol have their own set of political
and cultural challenges that are beyond the scope of this article [1].
Although there are several technological and economic reasons
why the development of energy systems based on renewable fuels
like woody biomass has been limited, less is known about the
cultural barriers to decentralizing energy. This research explores
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public debates about biomass development and decision-making
processes involved with renewable energy development since the
1970s. This historical examination adds to a growing pool of
research that acknowledges that our energy problems are not only
technological; they are also deeply social and political [2]. Using
an historical approach reveals the often hidden cultural barriers to
developing renewable energy systems, and helps to illuminate the
complex interaction of ideas, attitudes, and policy. As historians
Richard F. Hirsh and Christopher F. Jones note, historical perspectives on energy transitions provide a deeper understanding of the
nontechnical aspects of emerging technologies, and can help to
explain why new technologies sometimes fail, “even when they
appear to have appealing technical attributes [3].” The history of
woody biomass since the energy crises in the 1970s provides a
compelling demonstration of this phenomenon.
Most of the literature on energy transitions in the top three
energy journals has focused on markets, policy mechanisms, climate change, and pricing [4]. Moreover, Frank Laird and Kathleen
Araújo have noted that the literature on energy transitions has
emphasized changes in dominant fuel sources and technologies;
less has been written about the social and political dynamics
surrounding distributed power systems [5]. Hancock and Vivoda
suggest that although the ﬁeld of international political economy
began in the 1970s and has concerned itself primarily with global
dynamics involved in the fossil fuel-based economy, future energy
scholars should pay more attention to community interests and
renewable energy [6]. On a related note, Araújo advocates for paying greater attention to the sociopolitical aspects of distributed
power systems and the agency of a wider range of actors involved
in energy transitions [7]. This paper aims to help ﬁll some of these
research gaps by employing human-centered methods and historical perspectives to help shed light on the cultural barriers involved
in energy transitions.
More speciﬁcally, this historical analysis of different ideas
and attitudes towards woody biomass energy since the 1970s
helps to illuminate how public narratives about forest-based fuels
were linked to broader ideas about political power, pollution, and
resource management. In this way, the paper reveals the “interpretive ﬂexibility” of emerging biomass-based energy systems, where
the meaning of new kinds of energy technologies arose from the
negotiation of different groups’ ideas and values [8]. These conﬂicting ideas and values contributed to a sense of uncertainty about
biomass technologies. That sense of risk limited private investment and, in combination with the relatively low price of fossil
fuels, worked to prevent the widespread adoption of biomassbased energy technologies in the US in the late-twentieth century.
This research primarily focuses on the US, but discusses how
wood energy innovation in Nordic countries and conﬂict over
biomass development in the UK shaped public debate in the US.
Although most energy research has focused on North American
countries and there is need to explore other parts of the globe –
developing nations in particular – because energy decisions made
in the US have played such a signiﬁcant role in affecting global
economics and climate, studies like this can help to illustrate how
cultural factors helped to reinforce centralized, fossil-fuel-based
energy systems. As the leading consumer of fossil fuels, the US
has played the most signiﬁcant role in affecting the earth’s climate and resources in the past half century. Between 1970 and
2013, the US produced more carbon dioxide emissions than any
other country, and over 4/5th of the energy consumed in the US
during that time came from fossil fuels [9]. In contrast, by 2009,
2.5 billion people – over a third of the global population – continued to rely on wood as a primary energy source, and most of
those people lived in developing nations [10]. Because the political and cultural dynamics surrounding decision-making processes
in the US were completely different from those in places where

most of the world’s wood energy users lived, this research may
not translate into direct policy prescriptions for decision-makers
in developing countries. Instead, the study shows how different
ideas about centralized versus decentralized energy technologies
reﬂect underlying values and political ideals. This broader lesson
has important implications that extend beyond any one nation’s
borders.
This paper begins with a brief history of wood energy and the
international context within which renewed interest in biomass
energy arose in the US in the 1970s, ﬁrst after the oil embargo in
1973 and then more strongly after the decline of Iranian oil output produced fears of fuel scarcity in 1978–1979. It then explores
the arguments made by biomass advocates – those who promoted a
range of new wood-burning technologies such as residential woodstoves, wood boilers, combined heat and power (CHP) facilities,
and municipal electricity stations – for relocalizing energy systems
through the use of wood. Like the rhetoric and rationales promoted
by energy entrepreneurs in other times and places, biomass advocates had visions about how the revival of wood energy would
help to rearrange social and political relationships [11]. The paper
then examines narratives constructed by critics of wood energy,
and explains how conﬂicting narratives contributed to the sense
of risk surrounding biomass-based energy systems, and inadvertently limited private investment and inﬂuenced public policy. I
conclude by exploring the implications of this historical analysis
for current renewable energy initiatives and policy makers in the
US and elsewhere.

2. Discussion
2.1. Forest fuels: from wood energy to biomass advocacy
Like most nations until the nineteenth century, the US’s energy
economy was powered primarily by wood. Trees provided fuel to
heat homes and businesses, to move trains and goods, and, through
the creation of charcoal, to make iron. From domestic use to early
industrial production, to railroad construction and operation, wood
sustained nearly all aspects of life, and fueled the great accumulation of wealth by industrialists by the end of the nineteenth century.
The rise of the railroads was inextricably linked to the growth of the
timber industry, and the federal government contributed to woodbased economic growth by providing ﬁnancial payments and land
grants. Timber barons’ ability to take advantage of these kinds of
federal subsides played a key role in establishing wood as the basis
of the US economy in the nineteenth century, and provided precedent for federal involvement in wood-powered industries [12].
As the population increased and industry expanded after the
Civil War, concern about the fear of timber famine spread. Just
as renewable energy advocates in the twentieth century worried
about peak oil, energy entrepreneurs in the nineteenth century
expressed concern about the decline of the wood supply. Concerns
about timber famine inspired many of the conservation reforms
of the Progressive Era, and Gifford Pinchot’s work to develop a
national forest system. By the early twentieth century, however,
coal began to replace wood as the nation’s primary energy source,
and the public’s fears about running out of energy were assuaged
by boosters’ promises of the quality of life and sense of connectedness that would come from more concentrated forms of energy
[13].
Although wood continued to heat homes in many rural, forested
communities throughout the twentieth century, its role as a major
economic driver subsided as coal and oil took on greater importance [14]. After World War II, the suburbs sprawled, the middle
class grew, and the American automobile transformed lifestyles and
landscapes [15]. This growth and prosperity was largely based upon

S. Mittlefehldt / Energy Research & Social Science 14 (2016) 13–21

fossil fuels – oil in particular – and the political infrastructure that
surrounded and reinforced fossil fuel industries [16]. As fossil fuel
consumption increased, wood-based energy consumption in the US
was relegated to poorer rural areas. Although wood had provided
three-quarters of the US energy supply in 1870 and a quarter of the
supply in 1900, by 1972, wood provided less than two percent of the
country’s total energy [17]. Instead of using trees to feed, heat, and
transport themselves, Americans had became increasingly dependent on oil produced in the Middle East by the ﬁnal decades of the
twentieth century.
When the Arab members of the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced the oil embargo in 1973,
energy became front-page news and the search for domestic energy
supplies was on. The Washington Post dubbed the fuels crisis “the
biggest long-term problem we have [18].” In addition to daily
concerns about getting to work and rising heating bills, Americans and Europeans grew increasingly anxious about their growing
dependence on foreign oil—and on political regimes in the Middle East. Leaders within the forest products industry responded to
this widespread anxiety, and entrepreneurs began to explore new
ways to produce energy from wood. New wood burning technologies included more efﬁcient woodstoves, new types of wood-ﬁred
boilers, cogeneration facilities that could produce both heat and
power, and mechanisms that could help convert large, industrial
coal- and oil-ﬁred power plants to wood and other biofuels. As more
advanced technologies were developed in the late 1970s and 1980s,
“wood” became “biomass,” and an ancient fuel was rebranded with
a new sense of technological modernity and purpose. Some of these
new wood-ﬁred – now “biomass” – technologies included combined heat and power (CHP) facilities, industrial power plants, and
district heating systems based on European designs.
Interest in forest-based fuels began slowly in the early 1970s
after the oil embargo, but gained greater traction by the end of the
decade. As the Iranian Revolution broke out and that country’s oil
output declined, forestry professionals met at the Joint Convention
of the Canadian Institute of Forestry and the Society of American
Foresters. Forest economist G. Robinson Gregory noted that the
control of energy prices by politically motivated nationalists in the
Middle East had “created an element of uncertainty that hangs over
almost every decision made in business or government today [19].”
The oil shocks of 1978–1979 provided renewed motivation for new
wood-burning technologies like boilers and cogeneration plants.
Benjamin Russell, a large forest landowner in the southern US and
leader in the forest products industry, predicted that by 1985, the
United States would depend on foreign oil for 60–70% of its energy
needs, which would “make government price control academic,
since most of the oil would not be subject to US price regulations but
to the dictates of OPEC [20].” To attempt to control energy prices, he
advocated for the development of domestic energy sources, including wood. These sentiments reﬂected a concern that was shared by
a growing number of residents in western nations about the consequences of energy dependency and the concentration of power
in politically unstable places.
Like other renewable energy advocates in the 1970s, biomass
advocates argued that a political economy based on local sources
of renewable energy would look much different than a global economy based on massive reserves of fossil fuels. Estimates of just how
much biomass-based energy could contribute to the US’s energy
portfolio varied widely. Some predicted that wood could contribute
3 1/2% to the energy budget of the nation, while others predicted it
could be 10% or more in forested parts of the country [21]. In testimony before the US House Subcommittee on Forests in 1978, Dr.
Tom Ripley, Director of Forestry for the Tennessee Valley Authority,
argued that if logging wastes, mill residues, intensive biomass production and other available harvestable material were combined,
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the US could generate enough BTUs to exceed the amount of oil the
country imported each year [22].
Whatever its total contribution, biomass was an inherently
decentralized source of fuel. Most advocates acknowledged that
wood would never completely replace other forms of energy.
Instead, they argued that biomass should be part of a broader, more
diverse portfolio of energy sources. They suggested that instead of
looking for a silver bullet like nuclear power to replace fossil fuels
– and thus continuing the path of concentrated power and centralized control – countries should pursue a “silver buckshot” approach
[23]. This involved a system of power generation that would place
decision-making power in the hands of local or regional authorities
instead of Middle East oil cartels or politicians in national centers. A
successful biomass project, according to advocates from the World
Resources Institute, was one that involved an active, diverse group
from within the community where the facility was to be located.
They argued that biomass technologies must be designed for “social
as well as physical efﬁciency. There may never be a single ‘biomass
transistor’ that can be ‘plugged in’ anywhere, anytime [24].” As
an inherently local fuel source, new wood-burning energy technologies could thus help to create social and political systems that
would not only decentralize the means of energy production, but in
doing so, would also decentralize decision-making processes about
energy technologies more broadly.
Although many biomass advocates believed that decentralized
energy systems could help redistribute physical power as well as
political power, their public narratives often conveyed visions for
the future that differed from those promoted by other renewable
energy advocates. Frank Laird has shown how in the mid-twentieth
century, a subset of solar advocates envisioned a particularly bright
future in which decentralized sources of fuel and methods of distribution would help to create a more just and egalitarian society.
Radical social thinkers like Murray Bookchin touted solar energy as
a means to promote widespread social and economic reform [25].
For Bookchin and many solar advocates in the late 1970s, restructuring systems of energy production and distribution involved the
fundamental reconﬁguration of existing political infrastructure.
Advocates of wood energy tended to be less explicit about creating radical social reform through the use of forest fuels. Instead,
the narratives they used to promote wood energy expressed a
vision that was pragmatic, based on immediate economic needs
and resource availability. This pragmatic approach was nurtured
by the fact that using trees for energy required direct involvement
in land management decisions on a broad scale, and wood energy
advocates typically had professional backgrounds in forestry and
natural resource management. Their experiences in the ﬁeld helped
to hone a particular problem-solving orientation that had characterized a kind of environmental pragmatist tradition since the early
twentieth century, particularly in the US as exempliﬁed by ﬁgures
such as Aldo Leopold and Benton MacKaye [26].
In addition to this active, problem-solving orientation, wood
energy advocates in the late 1970s routinely emphasized that the
effectiveness of converting to biomass technologies depended on
the particular needs, available resources, and viable energy alternatives in a given locale. They acknowledged that forests were not
equally distributed across the planet and therefore not a universal
solution to energy problems everywhere. Yet at the same time, they
argued that forest resources were “much more evenly distributed
than are fossil fuels, which tend to be concentrated in a few regions
[27].” This pragmatic, place-based approach to pioneering a new
industry of renewable wood-based energy technologies was one
that advocates hoped would slowly usher in a new era of distributed
power generation. The end result of this vision would be a world in
which local ofﬁcials, landowners, institutions, and woods workers
exerted more control over decisions about energy.
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Wherever biomass projects were promoted – be they in the sylvan hills of New England or in the frozen ﬂatlands of Fennoscandia
– many argued that the decentralized nature of biomass energy
was one of its greatest strengths. Because transporting and processing wood added additional costs in terms of labor and fuel,
and because of the distributed nature of the forest resource, many
biomass advocates agreed that developing distributed systems of
several smaller-scale operations would be more successful than
concentrating development in a fewer larger-scale ones [28]. It simply did not make sense to burn fossil fuels to process and transport
woodchips long distances; therefore, biomass technologies could
not concentrate power in the same ways that fossil fuels could.
Furthermore, advocates pointed out that the problems associated
with small generating plants in terms of economies of scale became
less pronounced as capital became scarcer during recession in the
1970s [29]. As a result, they argued that biomass, an inherently
decentralized power source, was becoming an increasingly attractive alternative to unstable power systems associated with fossil
fuel.
Not surprisingly, forest products industries in Scandinavian
countries and the US were ﬁrst to switch to wood fuels to power
their own operations. In 2002, 14% (89TWh) of Sweden’s total
energy supply came from biomass and of that total, 57% was used
in the forest products industry [30]. Similar trends occurred in the
US where by 1976, 30% of the total energy needed to power the
US lumber industry came from burning its own wood wastes, and
by 1981, the US pulp and paper industry was 50% self-sufﬁcient in
energy [31]. The rationale for using energy from wood in these cases
was not necessarily to transform society, but rather to help solve
the immediate problem of rising energy costs with an abundant
resource at hand: wood waste [32]. In this sense, the leadership of
the forest products industry in pioneering biomass energy innovation contributed to the pragmatism of biomass enthusiasts.
Energy entrepreneurs in Sweden, Finland, and Norway were
among the ﬁrst to realize the potential of forests to address not
only the energy needs of the forest products industry, but the world
energy crises of the 1970s. In 1973, Sweden depended on foreign
oil for 70 percent of its energy needs [33]. Forest industries in
Sweden and Finland had long served as important components
of each nation’s national economy and contributed to cultural
identity—two critical themes that surfaced in the rhetoric promoted by biomass advocates in those countries’ efforts to develop
wood energy. Although Sweden’s tax policies favored nuclear
power as a domestic energy strategy in the 1970s, by 1990 growing concerns about the safety of nuclear power combined with a
strong carbon tax spurred the rapid growth in forest fuel technologies. These technologies transferred quickly to Norway and
Finland, neighboring countries that shared similar cultural and biophysical geographies and strong public appreciation of forested
landscapes [34]. As biomass became an important part of Swedish,
Norwegian, and Finnish energy policy in the 1990s, wood energy
advocates in those countries increasingly tied their arguments
about biomass energy to sustainable development and the promotion of local livelihoods, particularly in northern regions of these
countries where forestry continued to serve as an important source
of income for large agrarian populations [35]. These arguments
about identity and community development were also common
in narratives produced by advocates in places like Austria, the UK,
and the US who sought to develop wood-burning technologies.
To promote the use of local forests for fuel, biomass advocates
often employed rhetoric that was infused with appeals to a strong
sense of local identity and autonomy. Many claimed wood to be
a “native” or “indigenous” energy source [36]. Northern New England was especially dependent on oil because of the region’s remote
location, severe winter weather, and depressed rural economy.
Biomass advocates there claimed that burning wood for heat was

becoming cheaper than burning oil and gas imports, but more fundamentally, they argued that harvesting trees and burning wood
were part of the region’s cultural heritage. Wood energy ﬁt neatly
into the image of rugged individualism and self-sufﬁciency that
characterized the region and other rural places in the United States.
Robert Monks, the Director of Maine’s Ofﬁce of Energy Resources
advocated for a $10 million plant to make methanol from wood.
In 1975, 86 percent of the state’s energy sources were imported,
and a signiﬁcant portion of that was from petroleum-based heating oil. Monks claimed that “here the necessity of life in the coldest
damn place imaginable is controlled by foreigners [37].” Without
new sources of local energy like the methanol plant, he believed
that Mainers would be “utterly without the capacity for helping
ourselves [38].”
In Vermont, Governor Thomas Salmon appointed a task force to
study the potential of wood energy in 1975. The task force found
that locally produced wood could provide up to 25 percent of Vermont’s power, including industrial and home heating needs. In
addition to creating new jobs, saving money, and increasing returns
to forest landowners, the task force claimed that harvesting wood
for energy would help free Vermonters from the clenching jaws
of energy dependence [39]. Similarly, in the winter of 1983–1984,
wood provided heat to nearly one-third of New Hampshire homes,
with another 16 percent of households burning wood as a supplemental source of heat. A member of the Society for the Protection
of New Hampshire forests claimed, “New England had returned to
its origins [40].” These examples from Maine, Vermont, and New
Hampshire illustrate how the use wood for fuel was inextricably
linked to questions about cultural identity, political autonomy, and
decentralized control.
In some ways, the desire for “native” fuels and the search for
“indigenous” energy sources may have reﬂected anti-Arab sentiment that arose in the 1970s and 1980s. As fear of resource
dependency and competition for energy resources arose, Arab
Americans increasingly encountered racist attitudes and stereotypes. One Arab American woman living in Detroit noted that the
oil shortages of 1973 and 1979–1980 had helped to produce the
stereotype of the rich oil sheik, who was portrayed as being “intent
on buying up America and the world with his newfound wealth.”
Moreover, she commented that, “American institutions and media
sources promote depictions of Arabs as grissly-faced [sic], hooknosed characters, dressed in traditional garb, looming menacingly
over helpless Americans at the gas pump [41].” These images were
perpetuated by the US Department of Energy in a campaign to
encourage energy conservation and lower speed limits in the late
1970s. Playing on Americans’ xenophobia, the agency distributed
bumper stickers that read “The faster you drive, the richer they get”
and “Driving 75 is sheik, driving 55 is chic [42].” These kinds of initiatives reﬂected the broader cultural and political context in which
debates about domestic sources of renewable energy occurred.
Whether framed as the promotion of self-sufﬁciency or the
perpetuation of xenophobic attitudes towards the Middle East,
biomass advocates in the US and around the world routinely
emphasized that forest-based fuels could help to diversify the
global energy economy. In the 1990s, their motivation for diversifying energy systems shifted from energy security to incorporate
a greater focus on environmental concerns, particularly in relation to the problem of global warming. Biomass advocates noted
that compared to burning coal, burning wood produced fewer of
some greenhouse gases like sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides.
Also, depending on what type of fuel biomass replaced, the technology used, the particular application (for heat versus electricity), and
the methods of reforestation, biomass could be considered a carbon
neutral source of energy [43]. Essentially, carbon emitted during the
combustion of woody material could be sequestered elsewhere by
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new growing trees if proper forest management techniques were
employed.
Although advocates had noted some of the environmental
dimensions of using wood energy in the 1970s, the focus on climate mitigation became more pronounced by end of the twentieth
century [44]. In The Woodburners Encyclopedia, Jay Shelton noted
that “There is no denying the environmental impact of greatly
increased wood use. The questions are how, and how much, to
limit the impact and how the impact compares to that of alternatives (oil, coal, nuclear power, etc.) [45].” Between the 1970s and
1990s, the focus of environmental concern broadened from issues
like forest health to include human impacts on climate, and the
rhetoric of biomass advocates reﬂected this shift. Starting in the
1990s and continuing into the twenty-ﬁrst century, biomass advocates maintained that “perhaps the greatest environmental beneﬁt
of burning biomass for energy is its positive impact in moderating climate change [46].” In this way, the narratives produced by
biomass advocates reﬂected changing environmental values and
the shifting priorities of the environmental movement. The integration of economic and environmental rationales for using wood
energy revealed an important shift in environmental discourse,
and the movement towards a more encompassing framework of
sustainability.
In some ways, biomass advocates’ problem-solving orientation
and their desire for a more pluralistic approach to energy production helped to overcome an increasingly polarized political
landscape in the late twentieth century. In other cases, however, the
narratives conveyed by biomass advocates clashed with new ideas
about the recreational, aesthetic, and ecological values of forests.
These conﬂicting narratives would prove to have important implications for policy and private investment in the ﬁnal decades of the
twentieth century.
2.2. Embers of contention: concerns about biomass energy
Like those who advocated for the use of forest-based fuels, those
who argued against biomass employed a wide range of narratives to express concern about the potential consequences of using
wood for energy. These consequences included ecological and aesthetic impacts on forests, and air pollution threats to human health.
Others expressed concern about increasing competition for forest
resources. Though critical narratives came from disparate groups,
they expressed overarching themes: an increasingly uneasy relationship with working forests and concern about the public health
and social justice implications of renewable energy technologies. These perceptions of environmental and human health risks
threatened the economic viability of those distributed energy technologies, and may have contributed to making private investors and
policy-makers less inclined to support new energy systems.
Perhaps one of the greatest cultural barriers to using trees
for energy in the US was that it forced communities to see the
consequences of their energy consumption embedded in forested
landscapes. These were places that in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s,
more people increasingly valued for recreation, aesthetics, wildlife
habitat, and other non-productive values [47]. By the 1970s, many
had grown particularly critical about certain silvicultural practices like clearcutting and of harvesting trees in general. One study
reported that 77 percent of Americans thought that clearcutting
was bad, and over 50 percent believed that loggers were cutting
the country’s forests down faster than they could regrow [48]. Brock
Evans of the Sierra Club wrote in The Washington Post that the “overcutting” of the country’s forests was “one of the saddest parts of
our recent history [49].” Ralph Nader was also critical of the Forest
Service for opening the nation’s forests “to excessive private timbercutting at the expense of wildlife, recreation, and reforestation
[50].” These views were reﬂected in the landmark Monongahela
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decision in 1975, in which a federal judge ruled that the practice of
clearcutting violated the Forest Service Organic Administration Act
of 1897.
These attitudes toward forest harvesting practices were not
unique to the US. By the 1970s, widespread criticism of timber harvesting had intensiﬁed in forested regions around the world, and
people reported a growing aesthetic preference for untrammeled
forested landscapes. This trend has continued into the twenty-ﬁrst
century. For example, a survey of Norwegians’ landscape preferences found that wild and pristine forest environments near
lakes were the most highly appreciated type of landscape; recently
manipulated farm and forest scenes were among the least attractive [51]. In public statements against biomass, critics often focused
on the aesthetic impacts that increased production would have on
forests, and their narratives emphasized the non-productive value
of forests.
To counter these concerns, forest professionals tried to convince
the public that clearcutting was an ecologically sound practice and
was sometimes necessary in order to regenerate certain earlysuccessional tree species [52]. Kenneth Davis, President of the
Society of American Foresters, argued that although clearcutting was “initially unattractive and conspicuous to the public,”
reforestation usually occurred quickly [53]. Although clearcutting
was endorsed by the National Wildlife Federation, the American
Forestry Association, and the Society of American Foresters, most
members of the public remained unconvinced of the beneﬁts of this
harvesting practice. Narratives about how biomass energy would
impact the aesthetic value of forests revealed that how one viewed
silvicultural practices like clearcutting depended on one’s level of
education about forest succession and one’s attitude towards natural resource management. In many countries and in the US in
particular, interest in wild landscapes often superseded appreciation of working ones.
These different attitudes towards clearcutting reﬂected different ways in which groups valued forested landscapes. As with other
types of renewable energy development, wind turbines in particular, conﬂict about the aesthetic impacts of new technologies have
involved rural communities’ appreciation of productive land versus
urban populations’ interest in recreational or scenic landscapes
[54]. Navigating these different values posed challenges to renewable energy developers, especially as urban dwellers sprawled into
the hinterlands towards the end of the twentieth century.
In addition to concerns about the aesthetic impacts of wood
energy, a growing number of forest ecologists and environmentalists began to write about the ecological impacts of removing
waste material at harvest sites—one of the primary sources of
biomass fuel. Earl Stone, Professor of Forest Soils at Cornell University, pointed out that woody debris left after a harvest served
many important ecological functions including wildlife habitat, soil
nutrients, and watershed protection. He noted that the public was
becoming more aware of the value of things once considered useless:
For many forest owners, as well as vocal hunter, outdoor, and
environmentalist groups, there are such things as den trees, cavity nesting birds, naturalism, diversity of habitats, species and
size classes, to mention only a few. Certainly a vast quantity of
‘waste’ is available but by no means all unharvested growth is
waste. Dead trees, weed trees, rotten trees, slash and brush are
not devoid of on-site value at all times and places [55].
Stone criticized biomass enthusiasts for not considering environmental trade-offs, and for not anticipating the public’s negative
reaction to an accelerated use of biomass energy. For example,
R. Metcalfe, Chairman of Canada’s Forests for the Future, pointed
out the biological limits of using biomass to meet the country’s
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energy needs. He stated that “if all Canadians started burning
wood, our environment – land, air and water – would quickly be
destroyed [56].” Metcalfe’s and Stone’s comments expressed the
ideas of a growing number of ecologically-minded individuals who
were concerned about repeating the wide-spread environmental
destruction that occurred when wood provided the basis of Canada
and the US’s energy economies in the nineteenth century [57]. Narratives like those expressed by Metcalfe and Stone also revealed
how concerns about the aesthetic and recreational value of forests
were often closely aligned with certain ecological views of forests
in the 1970s and 1980s.
In addition to concerns about the aesthetic and ecological
impacts of wood energy, critics also complained about potential
threats to public health. By 1981, several northern communities
that had come to rely heavily on burning wood for heat began to
report problems with particulates. Places like Missoula, Montana
routinely had air quality alerts and residents expressed concern
about the carcinogenic properties of particulates from wood [58].
Until the mid-1980s, however, most wood burning technologies
remained relatively decentralized and concern about potential
public health threats did not become a dominant part of public discourse against biomass energy until the late 1980s and 1990s, when
several coal-ﬁred electricity generating plants were converted to
burn wood and new wood-ﬁred power stations were proposed.
Large, industrial-scale power plants that burned wood instead of
coal presented a suite of issues that differed from those of smallerscale technologies; not only did these power plants use wood fuel
less efﬁciently, but they tended to concentrate public health problems in particular areas [59].
As industrial use of biomass-based electrical power increased in
the 1990s, concerns about environmental injustice arose. Because
existing power plants that converted fuel sources from coal to wood
were typically located in low-income communities, often with
large racial minority populations, environmental justice activists
argued that this new renewable fuel simply perpetuated the injustices inherent in fossil fuel-based energy systems. A report by the
NAACP found that African Americans who lived near power plants
fueled either by wood or coal were more likely to suffer a variety
of health effects than other Americans [60]. In 1994, when Michigan’s Department of Environmental Quality approved a proposal
to build the Genesse Power Station, a biomass plant located near
a low-income, predominantly African American neighborhood in
Flint, Michigan, activists argued it was an act of environmental
racism, and they ﬁled a complaint with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) stating that the agency had violated Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [61]. The protesters maintained that the
state had “engaged in a pattern and practice of race discrimination
by siting incinerators almost exclusively in predominately minority
communities [62].” They argued that historically disenfranchised
populations should not be further marginalized in order to meet
the state’s renewable energy portfolio standards. Despite the complaint, the Genesee Power Station was built and has continued to
operate for twenty years.
Concerns that arose over the biomass plant in Flint reveal that
renewable energy technologies were not exempt from concerns
about environmental injustice and racial discrimination. Although
many people assumed renewable energy technologies would produce fewer public health burdens than energy systems based on
fossil fuels, all energy sources produce beneﬁts and burdens. In
the case of biofuels, those beneﬁts and burdens were not always
distributed in an equitable manner [63]. The concerns raised by
protesters in Flint demonstrate how different social groups have
worked to shape the production of renewable energy systems, and
illustrate the range of motivations for participating in decisionmaking about new technologies.

Civil rights violations and environmental justice concerns were
also themes employed by biomass critics in countries around the
world. Underlying these themes were different ideas about appropriate scales of governance and the extent to which those affected
by new energy technologies should be involved in decision-making
processes [64]. In a study of biomass development in the UK, Bishnu
Raj Upreti found that mistrust in decision-making was among the
major sources of conﬂict [65]. Another study in England found that
residents in the city of Winkleigh strongly opposed a new proposed 21.5MWe biomass plant because they felt developers failed
to incorporate authentic two-way interactions between decisionmakers and the public in the decision-making process [66]. The
protests of activists in Flint, Michigan and the surveys of English residents suggest the importance of process – and the power of proper
procedure – in the transition to renewable energy technologies.
Narratives of opposition frequently came from those who would
be affected by new biomass technologies; those sources of opposition included not only residents living near large industrial
wood-burning power plants, but also representatives from the forest products industry. While many supported the development of
new fuelwood markets, others feared that demand for wood energy
would interfere with traditional forest product markets. For example, in Sweden, representatives of the pulp industry argued that
demand for woodchips would decrease the availability of material for pulp and would drive prices up [67]. Similar arguments
were made in the US where leaders of the forest products industry
expressed concern that a major increase in the use of forests for fuel
might negatively affect available supplies of raw material for other
uses [68]. These concerns reﬂected a kind of narrative inconsistency
among the forest products industry: some felt that the burgeoning
fuelwood market could help bolster other forest products, while
others believed that traditional forest product markets might be
threatened if the demand for forest fuels increased signiﬁcantly.
Narrative inconsistency within stakeholder groups and conﬂict
between them had long-term consequences for biomass development, and may have contributed to the instability of ﬁnancial
investment in wood-burning technologies. One reason for the lack
of ﬁnancial investment in biomass was political. Commenting on
the lack of federal policy and its relationship to private investment,
one biomass advocate noted: “If the manufacturing and distributing of wood were controlled by a handful of giant corporations
as nuclear, coal and oil [are], perhaps industry would take a serious interest [69].” Another reason for this lack of investment was
the perception of risk that came from competing public narratives
about renewable energy technologies like biomass. Why would
national governments – or private investors – want to put money
towards something that may create more social and environmental
problems than it could potentially solve, especially when the total
amount of energy produced by biomass would never be equivalent
to the massive amount of energy stored in fossil fuels?
Compared to the oil industry, which had been heavily subsidized by the US government since the early twentieth century,
federal investment in wood energy had taken a back seat by the
mid-twentieth century [70]. Even though President Carter’s 1977
National Energy Plan focused on energy conservation and sought to
remove price controls on oil and natural gas in order to help level
the playing ﬁeld for other forms of energy, his plan emphasized
domestic coal and nuclear power. Renewable energy advocates
had high hopes when Congress passed the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) in 1978. PURPA helped to restructure the
power of energy utilities by guaranteeing a market for “qualifying
facilities” – cogeneration plants and new types of small independent power facilities – the kinds of facilities for which biomass
was well-suited [71]. Yet despite creating incentives for nontraditional energy generation, without sustained investment in research
and development, biomass technologies failed to gain widespread
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entrance into the marketplace. The US was not alone in this respect;
other forest-rich countries like Canada had invested little to no
funding towards the research and development of biomass energy
technologies by the late 1970s [72]. This lack of sustained federal investment in renewable energy like biomass had cascading
effects—it made private investors less inclined to invest.
Like wind and solar, biomass was poised to beneﬁt from PURPA’s
policy incentives for smaller renewable projects. But like other
renewables, biomass skeptics pointed out problems associated
with intermittency. Although for wind, trouble with intermittency
usually meant lack of blowing wind, for biomass, it had more to
do with the many moving parts in the system—the difﬁculty in
coordinating the logging, chipping, trucking, storing, and burning of woody material. Like skeptics of solar and wind, those who
questioned the viability of biomass energy pointed out the lack of
infrastructure to facilitate the widespread adoption of such technologies, and the problems that lack of infrastructure posed for
commercialization. Like other renewable energies, biomass critics
noted that the economies of scale would also be hurdle; no singular
fuel source would be able to compete with the massive amount of
energy produced by fossil fuels. Skeptics also noted that renewable
fuels like biomass or wind remained utterly dependent on fossil
fuels for production and distribution. These concerns about intermittency, lack of infrastructure, and economies of scale were real
limiting factors not only for biomass, but for other forms of renewable energy as well. Yet it is important to note that the perception
of these technological and economic limitations also contributed
to public hesitancy to support renewable fuels. In this way, cultural beliefs compounded the material problems associated with
technology and economics.
An examination of different forms of opposition toward biomass
reveals that one of the barriers to decentralizing energy has been
cultural anxiety about the ecological and public health impacts of
local energy. Public opposition based on these important public
concerns helped to perpetuate the sense that like other renewables, biomass technologies were a relatively risky investment. This
uncertainty may have deterred potential investors and policy makers from taking a more proactive approach to support this form of
renewable fuel. In this sense, public discourse worked to limit –
or at least to slow – biomass development. In doing so, narrative
conﬂict helped to inadvertently reinforce the path of centralized,
fossil-fuel based energy systems.

2.3. Conclusion: the paradox of local power
The history of public discourse about biomass development
illustrates a core paradox of local power: distributing power away
from the centralized systems of production that brought unprecedented amounts of energy to American consumers in the twentieth
century required local communities to accept the ecological and
public health risks of their consumption. It forced energy users to
confront the consequences of their consumption—a sight that that
many preferred to be left unseen [73]. Decentralizing energy systems also required navigating local conﬂicts over land use, civil
rights, and resource management that rivaled national debates in
terms of their complexity. Despite the promise of local power, these
hidden risks and complicated political dynamics were things most
communities were not willing to accept or able to work through.
Thus, while decentralized sources of renewable energy like biomass
have had the potential to help shift the economy away from fossil
fuels, we have not been equipped to deal with the consequences.
Although there have been many technological and scientiﬁc challenges to developing distributed energy systems like biomass, those
factors have often been overshadowed by more fundamental cultural ideas and complex socio-political dynamics.
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Those who have advocated for decentralized energy systems
have had to navigate a complex boundary between maintaining
local control over decision-making while also taking advantage
of national policy tools and structures. In Sweden, the successful development of biomass has largely occurred as a result of
favorable national tax policies bolstered by widespread public support for domestic sources of renewable energy. In the US, biomass
development has been limited not only because of fewer federal
incentives, but also because of social and environmental concerns.
The more recent quest to reduce carbon emissions has spurred the
development of renewable energy technologies like solar panels,
wind turbines, and biomass facilities, but like all technologies, these
renewable energy systems have frequently created unintended
consequences on ecosystems and human communities. People
have responded to those consequences in very different ways.
Navigating current tensions between renewable energy advocacy,
environmental concerns, and social justice requires close attention
to how and why different understandings arose, and how they have
played out in public discourse.
Narratives produced by those who promoted biomass and those
who protested it reveal different visions of how a transition to
biomass could affect political power. Because of the inherently
local, decentralized nature of biomass systems, forest fuels had the
potential to reform the political power systems associated with
conventional energy technologies. Yet unlike solar advocates in
the mid-twentieth century who explicitly sought radical change
through the development of decentralized energy technologies,
biomass advocates took a more pragmatic approach. Although
advocates of wood energy were part of a larger chorus of voices
in the 1970s that promoted the idea that local control of energy
production and distribution was increasingly necessary, they did
not seek to subvert dominant political paradigms. In cases where
coal-ﬁred plants were being converted to biomass, and where
large industrial-scale biomass plants were proposed, wood energy
advocates relied on existing energy infrastructure and the political dynamics that controlled those systems. In some cases, like the
Genesee Power Station in Flint, Michigan, biomass advocates may
have inadvertently perpetuated entrenched systems of inequality. Many acknowledged the dependence of wood energy on fossil
fuels for harvesting and transportation, and held fast to the conservative political views that historically characterized business
leaders within the forest products industry. So while in some ways
biomass was touted as a domestic source of renewable energy that
could help alleviate dependence on unstable political regimes in
the Middle East, its development was limited not only by the distributed nature of forest resources, but also by the ideas of those
who promoted it and those who opposed it.
Understanding history does not allow us to predict the future.
But as historians Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May have
demonstrated, history does allow us to view events as part of
a time-stream, where we can imagine the future to be when it
becomes the past with “some intelligible continuity but richly
complex and able to surprise [74].” In the context of energy transitions, historical perspectives allow us to better understand the
cultural and political struggles that renewable energy leaders have
faced—the nontechnical factors that often get buried in the tomes of
work on energy written by economists and technicians. By examining the nuances of narratives constructed by those who promoted
and those who opposed renewable energies like biomass, we gain
a more complex view of the dynamic interaction between cultural ideas about nature, power, and the implementation of new
technology. An exploration of conﬂicting narratives can help us to
understand – and therefore better address – the underlying barriers to public support for energy transitions. In the case of biomass
development, narratives explored here reveal that the challenges to
developing more sustainable energy systems are not just technical

20

S. Mittlefehldt / Energy Research & Social Science 14 (2016) 13–21

problems, but are also based on the complexity of diverse human
experiences and perceptions.
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